

Voting Centers and Polling Places to further reduce lines and check-in wait times at the polls, and to process provisional ballot voters more expeditiously.

OBJECTIVE 2: ENHANCEMENT OF THE OVERALL ACCURACY OF THE VOTER REGISTRY.

INITIATIVE 2.1: Conduct the 2017 biennial canvass/close out the 2013 biennial canvass. After the November 8, 2016 General Election, the BOE will mail postcards to individuals on the voter registry who did not vote in the election asking them to confirm their voter registration addresses. As a result of the canvass, these voters' records may be updated, made inactive, or removed. In addition, the Board will remove the records of those individuals (inactive voters) who both failed to respond to an address confirmation notice sent during the 2013 biennial canvass and failed to vote (or to appear to vote) in the next two federal general elections (the November 4, 2014 General Election and the November 8, 2016 General Election).

INITIATIVE 2.2: Continued, regular participation in multi-state list maintenance programs. The BOE will utilize Electronic Registration Information Center ("ERIC") and State and Territorial Exchange of Vital Events ("STEVE") to identify and take the appropriate action with respect to duplicate voter registrations, voters who are deceased, and voters who have moved within or outside of their jurisdictions.

INITIATIVE 2.3: Deployment of Automatic Voter Registration. In accordance with the Automatic Voter Registration Amendment Act of 2016, the BOE will partner with the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to automatically register or update existing registration information for all eligible individuals who apply for or renew their DMV-issued identification. The electronic transmission of the data required to register individuals or update their existing records will be transmitted electronically, which will reduce data entry errors and thus lead to a more accurate voter registry.

OBJECTIVE 3: Deployment of mobile petition circulation application. In accordance with the Ballot Access Modernization Amendment Act of 2016, the BOE will implement a pilot program that will enable a limited number of candidates, qualified petition circulators, and ballot measure proposers to use a mobile application, in addition to the paper circulation process, to gather electronic signatures on a mobile device registered with the Board for the September 2018 Primary Election.

OBJECTIVE 4: CONTINUED VOTER EDUCATION AND OUTREACH AND POLL WORKER RECRUITMENT EFFORTS.

INITIATIVE 4.1: Deploy Ward Outreach Coordinators throughout District of Columbia to raise awareness about voter registration, upcoming elections, the recently acquired voting equipment, and the opportunity to serve as poll workers.

**OBJECTIVE 5: EXPLORE NEW MODELS FOR CONDUCTING POLL
WORKER TRAINING**

INITIATIVE 5.1: Conduct research regarding the feasibility, benefits, and drawbacks of adding an online component to the poll worker training program.

KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

Measure	Fiscal Year 2014 (4/1/2014 Primary Election)	Fiscal Year 2014 (7/15/14 Special Election)	Fiscal Year 2015 (11/4/14 General Election)	Fiscal Year 2015 (4/28/15 Special Election)	Fiscal Year 2016 (Projected) (4/5/16 Primary Election)	Fiscal Year 2016 (Actual) (6/14/16 Primary Election)	Fiscal Year 2017 (Projected) (11/8/16 General Election)
Percent of Election Day polling places opened at 7 AM	98.6%	94.1%	97.9%	100%	98%	98%	99%
Percent of voting equipment open at 7 AM	88.1%	94.1%	94.4%	94.4%	90%	94%	95%
Percent of polling places with voting data returned to headquarters by midnight on Election Night	99%	99%	100%	100%	99%	100%	100%
Number of early voting centers opened	13	2	9	3	12	9	9
Percent of trained workers in the field on Election Day	98.8%	99.4%	99.7%	100%	97%	99.4%	99.5%
Number of voter education, registration, election worker recruitment, or equipment demonstration events attended	91		N/A		100	198	62
Number of candidate or circulator training events scheduled	22		10	26	24	26	26
Number of absentee voting events for special populations conducted	23		N/A		15	22	23

AGENCY WORKLOAD MEASURES

Measure	Fiscal Year 2014 (4/1/2014 Primary Election)	Fiscal Year 2014 (7/15/2014 Special Election)	Fiscal Year 2015 (11/4/2014 General Election)	Fiscal Year 2015 (4/28/15 Special Election)	Fiscal Year 2016 (6/14/16 Primary Election)
Total ballots cast and counted	99,394	1,715	177,377	18,063	100,423
Number of absentee ballots requested by deadline	5,520	278	8,535	1,113	9,142
Number of special ballots processed	10,849 (7,476 counted/ 3,373 rejected)	150	20,116 (18,921 counted/1,195 rejected)	1,405 (1158 counted/ 247 rejected)	3540 (442 counted/ 3,098 rejected)
Number of voter registration applications received (new and updates)	77,125		90,637		134,198
Number of registration applications received online (new and updates)	84		18		1,999
Number of voters made inactive on rolls	41,216		13,815		1,310
Number of voters removed from rolls	29,841		62,943		13,114
Number of voter education, registration, election worker recruitment, or equipment demonstration events requested	106		36		67



**32nd Annual
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2016 Professional Practices Program

Before Plan B: Predicting Election Worker No-Shows

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Before Plan B: Predicting Election Worker No-Shows

Election worker absences have the potential to seriously disrupt polling place operations and harm voter confidence in the electoral process. While unexpected absences due to illness or emergency are impossible to predict, a statistical analysis of election worker characteristics reveals insights into absenteeism. Armed with these insights, election boards can better manage the risk of pollworker absenteeism through a matrix that identifies precincts where absenteeism is likelier to occur and plan accordingly.

Methodology

D.C. Board of Elections analyzed a sample of 4048 workers taken from the past three primary elections (2010, 2012, 2014). Our analysis focused on the relationship between showing up on Election Day and the following variables: worker age, pay rate, previous service as an election worker, the distance the worker had to travel to get to the polls, and precinct location within the city.

For our analysis to be accurate, we first determined which variables actually have a significant enough effect on absenteeism to be studied. The variables of age, pay rate, and, most importantly, the number of times an election worker previously served had the strongest relationships to absenteeism.

What was the nature of those relationships? We learned the following:

- 1) For each increase in the number of times an election worker previously served, the odds of showing up on Election Day increased by a factor of three.
- 2) For each year increase in a worker's age, the odds of showing up on Election Day increased by 0.016%
- 3) For each \$1 increase in pay, the odds of showing up increased by 0.019%

For example, at our current rate of pay, a first-time worker who is 55 years old has odds of showing up of 10 to 1 (for every 10 who show, one will not). At that same rate of pay, a first-time worker aged 30 has odds of showing up of 6 to 1 (for every 6 who show, one will not). For workers with past experience, if we have two workers aged 55 and they're both offered the same pay, the odds of showing up of the worker who previously worked an election are 33 to 1 compared to the first-timer's odds of 10 to 1.

What did we do with these insights? We created in Excel an easy-to-reference precinct matrix in which we assigned an absenteeism risk level to every precinct in the city, based on the ages and service record of assigned election workers. (Our rate of pay does not vary among precincts, so pay is not factored in here).

How did we construct the matrix? We assigned a higher risk level for precincts expecting a higher number of younger workers. We also assigned a higher risk level to precincts expecting a lot of first-time election workers. Age strongly influences the absenteeism rate, but not as strongly as service history does. Thus, we adjusted the previous service variable to reflect that stronger influence.

To start, we created an Excel worksheet containing all the relevant data on our incoming election workers, including their precinct assignment. We added a second worksheet to calculate the age-specific


risk, a third sheet to calculate risk based on previous service as an election worker, and a final sheet containing color-coded final precinct risk scores.

For age-specific risk, we identified age categories at which the odds of showing up are eight to 1, 10 to 1, 12 to 1, and 15 to 1, with rate of pay holding at its current rate and factoring out work history. For each age category and precinct, we used the COUNTIFS function to count the number of individuals. We then calculated a risk score for the precinct based on the portion of workers falling into each age category. The higher the portion of precinct workers falling into younger age categories, the higher the age risk score we assigned that precinct.

With respect to risk based on assigned workers' previous service record, we used the COUNTIFS function to categorize assigned workers and again calculated a risk score based on the portion of workers falling into each category. We assigned higher risk scores to precincts with higher portions of precinct workers with shorter or no previous service records.

We calculated a precinct's final score by combining its age score and its previous service score, using the Excel SUMPRODUCT function to weight the service score by a factor of three to reflect its stronger influence on absenteeism. We also color coded each precinct based on scores to create an easy visual reference.


What role does the matrix play? Applying a statistical model helped us understand which factors contribute to absenteeism and to what degree. The matrix translates our analysis into a spreadsheet we can easily and readily consult when managing election worker staffing. The matrix is based on the following risk assessment:




By identifying where a precinct falls on the matrix, we can better prepare to shift workers to at-risk precincts, cross-train workers with lower risk of absenteeism, or make other adjustments to reduce the possibility of election worker absenteeism and all the disruptions to precinct operations absenteeism creates.

Supporting Documents


Probabilities that Election Workers Will Show Up on Election Day, Considering All Variables



Probability of Showing Up Given Hypothetical Pay Rates, Age Variable Holding



Probability of Showing Up Given Hypothetical Ages, All Other Variables Holding



Precinct	Age Score	Previous Service Score	Weighting Factor: Age	Weighting Factor: Service	Final Risk Score	Overall Risk of Absenteeism
1	75	33.33333333	25	75	43.75	LOW
2	100	66.66666667			75	HIGH
3	0	33.33333333			25	LOW
4	25	16.66666667			18.75	LOW
5	100	0			25	LOW
6	62.5	33.33333333			40.625	LOW
7	25	0			6.25	LOW
8	50	66.66666667			62.5	MEDIUM
9	0	33.33333333			25	LOW
10	12.5	16.66666667			15.625	LOW
11	50	66.66666667			62.5	MEDIUM
12	75	66.66666667			68.75	MEDIUM
13	25	0			6.25	LOW
14	25	0			6.25	LOW
15	50	66.66666667			62.5	MEDIUM
16	0	33.33333333			25	LOW
17	0	33.33333333			25	LOW
18	25	16.66666667			18.75	LOW
19	50	16.66666667			25	LOW
20	75	16.66666667			31.25	LOW
21	50	66.66666667			62.5	MEDIUM
22	75	66.66666667			68.75	MEDIUM
23	50	33.33333333			37.5	LOW
24	0	66.66666667			50	MEDIUM
25	75	66.66666667			68.75	MEDIUM
26	0	50			37.5	LOW
27	50	0			12.5	LOW
28	62.5	33.33333333			40.625	LOW
29	0	50			37.5	LOW
30	0	100			75	HIGH
31	12.5	50			40.625	LOW
32	0	66.66666667			50	MEDIUM
33	25	16.66666667			18.75	LOW
34	0	0			0	LOW
35	37.5	66.66666667			59.375	MEDIUM
36	50	66.66666667			62.5	MEDIUM
37	25	33.33333333			31.25	LOW
38	37.5	66.66666667			59.375	MEDIUM
39	25	66.66666667			56.25	MEDIUM
40	50	50			50	MEDIUM
41	50	66.66666667			62.5	MEDIUM
42	50	100			87.5	CRITICAL
43	87.5	66.66666667			71.875	MEDIUM
44	87.5	16.66666667			34.375	LOW
45	75	0			18.75	LOW
46	25	66.66666667			56.25	MEDIUM
47	0	66.66666667			50	MEDIUM
48	50	66.66666667			62.5	MEDIUM

49	0	66.66666667	50	MEDIUM
50	25	66.66666667	56.25	MEDIUM
51	37.5	33.33333333	34.375	LOW
52	37.5	50	46.875	LOW
53	62.5	83.33333333	78.125	HIGH
54	37.5	16.66666667	21.875	LOW
55	25	66.66666667	56.25	MEDIUM
56	50	0	12.5	LOW
57	37.5	33.33333333	34.375	LOW
58	0	33.33333333	25	LOW
59	25	33.33333333	31.25	LOW
60	25	66.66666667	56.25	MEDIUM
61	37.5	33.33333333	34.375	LOW
62	50	50	50	MEDIUM
63	50	66.66666667	62.5	MEDIUM
64	37.5	0	9.375	LOW
65	25	66.66666667	56.25	MEDIUM
66	0	50	37.5	LOW
67	25	66.66666667	56.25	MEDIUM
68	25	0	6.25	LOW
69	12.5	50	40.625	LOW
70	0	66.66666667	50	MEDIUM
71	25	50	43.75	LOW
72	37.5	66.66666667	59.375	MEDIUM
73	25	100	81.25	HIGH
74	0	66.66666667	50	MEDIUM
75	50	100	87.5	CRITICAL
76	62.5	16.66666667	28.125	LOW
77	75	50	56.25	MEDIUM
78	50	66.66666667	62.5	MEDIUM
79	25	50	43.75	LOW
80	50	0	12.5	LOW
81	50	50	50	MEDIUM
82	0	33.33333333	25	LOW
83	50	16.66666667	25	LOW
84	50	66.66666667	62.5	MEDIUM
85	100	0	25	LOW
86	50	33.33333333	37.5	LOW
87	12.5	16.66666667	15.625	LOW
88	50	66.66666667	62.5	MEDIUM
89	62.5	33.33333333	40.625	LOW
90	50	33.33333333	37.5	LOW
91	50	66.66666667	62.5	MEDIUM
92	37.5	66.66666667	59.375	MEDIUM
93	37.5	66.66666667	59.375	MEDIUM
94	50	33.33333333	37.5	LOW
95	75	100	93.75	CRITICAL
96	12.5	33.33333333	28.125	LOW
97	50	33.33333333	37.5	LOW
98	25	33.33333333	31.25	LOW
99	50	33.33333333	37.5	LOW
100	25	66.66666667	56.25	MEDIUM

101	12.5	33.33333333	28.125	LOW
102	37.5	66.66666667	59.375	MEDIUM
103	75	66.66666667	68.75	MEDIUM
104	25	0	6.25	LOW
105	50	100	87.5	
106	25	66.66666667	56.25	MEDIUM
107	25	66.66666667	56.25	MEDIUM
108	50	0	12.5	LOW
109	37.5	16.66666667	21.875	LOW
110	37.5	66.66666667	59.375	MEDIUM
111	37.5	66.66666667	59.375	MEDIUM
112	50	66.66666667	62.5	MEDIUM
113	50	66.66666667	62.5	MEDIUM
114	25	66.66666667	56.25	MEDIUM
115	37.5	50	46.875	LOW
116	25	50	43.75	LOW
117	25	66.66666667	56.25	MEDIUM
118	25	66.66666667	56.25	MEDIUM
119	50	66.66666667	62.5	MEDIUM
120	62.5	33.33333333	40.625	LOW
121	75	33.33333333	43.75	LOW
122	0	66.66666667	50	MEDIUM
123	75	66.66666667	68.75	MEDIUM
124	37.5	66.66666667	59.375	MEDIUM
125	75	33.33333333	43.75	LOW
126	50	66.66666667	62.5	MEDIUM
127	50	33.33333333	37.5	LOW
128	25	66.66666667	56.25	MEDIUM
129	50	66.66666667	62.5	MEDIUM
130	25	100	81.25	HIGH
131	50	0	12.5	LOW
132	0	100	75	HIGH
133	25	66.66666667	56.25	MEDIUM
134	50	33.33333333	37.5	LOW
135	25	66.66666667	56.25	MEDIUM
136	25	66.66666667	56.25	MEDIUM
137	50	33.33333333	37.5	LOW
138	12.5	66.66666667	53.125	MEDIUM
139	0	33.33333333	25	LOW
140	25	50	43.75	LOW
141	25	66.66666667	56.25	MEDIUM
142	25	66.66666667	56.25	MEDIUM
143	50	33.33333333	37.5	LOW



DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
BOARD OF ELECTIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001-2745



July 22, 2016

BY EMAIL AND HAND-DELIVERY

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RE: Audit Report: "The District of Columbia Voter File: Compliance with
Law and Best Practices"

Dear Ms. Patterson:

As I indicated in earlier communications, the Board of Elections (BOE) respectfully submits its response to the findings and recommendations set forth in the above-referenced Audit Report consistent with the committed timeline. We appreciate the opportunity to work with your audit team to continue improving the elections process for the citizens of the District of Columbia.

Best regards,


D. Michael Bennett, Chair
District of Columbia Board of Elections

**The District of Columbia Board of Elections' Response to the Office of the District of
Columbia Auditor's Report titled "The District of Columbia Voter File: Compliance with
Law and Best Practices"**

I. Introduction

An accurate voter list is essential to election planning and management. It prevents fraud in elections by ensuring that those who are ineligible to vote do not vote, and that those who have already voted in an election do not vote multiple times. It also introduces efficiencies into the voting process which allows voters to get in and out of the polling place expeditiously.

There are a myriad of challenges inherent in maintaining an accurate and up-to-date voter registry. These challenges are well-documented. The District of Columbia is a very transient jurisdiction; voters move within and outside of the District without notifying the BOE. Voters register multiple times with different information, which results in duplicate registrations. The voter registration system in the District of Columbia is, for the most part, paper-based, and thus susceptible to data entry errors. (For example, a clerk's inability to read the handwriting on a voter's application may impact the way the voter's name appears in the record). The BOE is constantly working to fine-tune the processes by which we legally rectify anomalies in the voter registry that are present as a result of challenges to list maintenance, and this work has proven fruitful. The District of Columbia has been recognized for being among the first jurisdictions to initiate a multi-state voter roll comparison with its contiguous jurisdictions, Maryland and Virginia. This comparison resulted in the removal of dual registrants and the referral of individuals who had voted in more than one jurisdiction during a presidential election to the U.S. Attorney's Office for prosecution.

The BOE's list maintenance efforts have been greatly improved by its online voter registration system, participation in the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) and State and Territorial Exchange of Vital Events (STEVE) programs, and the stabilization of the environment in which the BOE voter registration database resides. As a result of these enhancements, the District of Columbia's voter registry today is as accurate as it has ever been.

The BOE is wholly committed to the accuracy of the voter registry. That said, as we strive to identify and remove ineligible voters from our rolls, we must concurrently exercise extreme care not to remove eligible voters from the voter registry. Accordingly, the BOE does not remove voters unless there is clear and confirmable information that removal is the only appropriate course of action. To do otherwise would not only be improper, but would also undermine confidence in the integrity of the electoral process. The enfranchisement of eligible District of Columbia residents is the primary pillar of the BOE's mission. Any list maintenance activity must be conducted in accordance with that overarching principle based on the mandate of the law and regulations we are required to follow.

Below are the BOE's responses to the recommendations that have been made in the Audit Report issued on June 7, 2016. We will continue to work with the Office of the D.C. Auditor as we aim to ensure that the voter roll for the District of Columbia is thoroughly maintained in a manner that is consistent with federal and District law, as well as the BOE's regulations.

II. BOE Responses to the Office of the District of Columbia Auditor (ODCA) Recommendations

ODCA Recommendation #1: The BOE should develop written policies and procedures to ensure the implementation and monitoring of the following practices to ensure the integrity of the voter roll, as required by both federal and District law:

- Removal of incarcerated felons from the voter list;
- Removal of decedents from the voter list;
- Removal of duplicate voter records from the voter list; and
- Removal of inaccurate birth dates from the voter list.

Response: BOE disagrees.

The BOE currently has in place written policies and procedures to ensure the implementation and monitoring of the removal of incarcerated felons, decedents, duplicate voter records, and inaccurate birth dates from its voter registry. Moreover, the Board routinely reviews its list maintenance policies and procedures to ensure that we maintain compliance with our obligations under federal and District law, and we will continue to do so.

Below, the BOE addresses ODCA's specific findings concerning the removal of incarcerated felons, decedents, duplicate voter records, and inaccurate birth dates, and the actions the Board has taken or will take going forward with respect to each.

Incarcerated Felons. The BOE acknowledges that D.C. Official Code § 1-1001.07(k)(3) provides that "[t]he Board shall request at least monthly, and the Superior Court of the District of Columbia shall furnish, the name and address of each person incarcerated as a result of a felony conviction since the date of the previous report." While we have been receiving information regarding felony criminal convictions from the U.S. Attorney's Offices, we have now formally requested that the D.C. Superior Court also begin providing to the BOE, on a monthly basis, the name and address of each person incarcerated as a result of a felony so that the Board can ensure that all individuals who are ineligible to vote on this basis are removed from the voter registry.

Deceased Voters. Pursuant to D.C. Official Code § 1-1001.07(k)(2), "[t]he Board shall request at least monthly, and the Mayor shall furnish, the name, address, and date of birth, if known, of each District resident 18 years of age and over reported deceased within the District of Columbia, together with the name and address of each District resident who has been reported deceased by other jurisdictions since the date of the previous report." The BOE meets its obligations under D.C. Official Code § 1-1001.07(k)(2) by accessing vital records data housed at

the D.C. Department of Health through STEVE¹ and taking the appropriate action with respect to the information provided.

The Audit Report alleges that the BOE is not in compliance with D.C. Official Code § 1-1001.07(k)(2) and federal law because, as of November 4, 2015, the voter registry contained the names of 33 decedents whose dates of death ranged from January 30, 2011 through December 6, 2014. According to ODCA, the BOE failed to prove that it had requested verification of the deaths of these 33 individuals from the Mayor as required. This is simply not the case. BOE accessed STEVE on January 12, 2016 to retrieve a list of decedents in accordance with D.C. Official Code § 1-1001.07(k)(2). At that time, the BOE received a report containing a list of 242 decedents, including the 33 decedents identified by ODCA. The BOE removed 209 of these decedents from the voter registry upon finding an exact match between the data provided by STEVE and the data in the BOE voter registry for each of them. With respect to the remaining 33 individuals - those identified by ODCA - there was not an exact match between the data provided by STEVE and the data in the BOE voter registry. Consistent with established BOE practice, the BOE proceeded on the side of enfranchisement and did not remove these voters from the registry.²

Duplicate Voter Records. Duplicate registrations are due most often to voters registering multiple times with different information. More often than not, BOE staff is able to flag and resolve the duplications. However, despite best efforts, some duplicate registrations slip through the initial processing of records. In an effort to eradicate duplicates, we have adopted specific procedures to follow to assist with minimizing the duplicates that appear on the voter registry. In the past, BOE staff processed the Voter Merge Queue in Integrity, the Board's voter registration database, on a weekly basis. In an effort to identify and resolve duplicate records in a more efficient manner and to minimize the number of duplicate records that appear in the Voter Merge Queue, BOE staff has begun to review and meticulously work through potential duplicate files identified in Integrity's Voter Merge Queue on a daily basis.

The Audit Report correctly indicates that, through its participation in ERIC, the BOE is able to better identify and eliminate duplicate voter files. One of the list maintenance reports that ERIC provides is an In-state Duplicates Report.³ On September 18, 2015, the BOE received one such

¹ STEVE is a web-based application that allows for the secure exchange of vital records data between the D.C. Department of Health (DOH) and the BOE. DOH is the subordinate agency responsible for maintaining death records for the District of Columbia, and it performs this function through its Center for Policy, Planning and Evaluation's Vital Records Division (CPPE-VRD). In February 2014, and again in December 2015, the BOE entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with CPPE-VRD under which CPPE-VRD established a mailbox through which the BOE could access pertinent death record data on a monthly basis through STEVE.¹

² As of this writing, four of the 33 individuals have been deleted from the voter registry because the BOE received verification of the deaths of these individuals. The remaining 29 individuals have been placed on the inactive list.

³ The other list maintenance reports are: 1) the In-state Movers Report (the Department of Motor Vehicles or other in-state record identifies newer contact information for the voter); 2) the Cross-state Movers Report (A newer in-state record has been found for the voter, indicating that the voter may no longer live in the state); and 3) the Deceased Report (the voter has a matching record on the Social Security Death Master list). The January 19, 2016

report which identified 1868 potential duplicate voter records. BOE staff reviewed each of these records and merged or otherwise resolved 1711 of the duplicate voter files identified. With respect to the remaining 157 records identified as potential duplicates, BOE staff could not determine with certainty that the multiple records in question were, in fact, associated with the same individual. Consequently, the Board did not merge or delete the records at issue.

Inaccurate Birth Dates. Prior to the enactment of the Voter Registration Act of 1975 (December 16, 1975, D.C. Law 1-37, § 2(3)-(5), 22 DCR 3426), there was no explicit requirement in District of Columbia law for a voter registration applicant to provide his or her date of birth. The Voter Registration Act contained a provision that required the Board of Elections to mail to qualified applicants a nonforwardable registration notification form that included, among other things, the applicant's birth date. Accordingly, the BOE's voter registration application was amended in 1976 to solicit birth dates. Because the BOE did not have birth dates for voters who registered prior to 1975, each of these voters was assigned a default birth date of 12/31/1800 in Integrity, the BOE's voter registration system, so as to indicate that that particular data was missing. The inaccurate birthdates are generally those individuals who registered prior to the requirement to provide a date of birth.

Despite the fact that the records with default birth dates predate the specific legal requirement that a date of birth is needed to register to vote, the BOE has taken active steps to reduce the number of default birth dates in Integrity. We have attempted to contact all voters with default birth dates, but most of them have been unwilling to provide the BOE with accurate birth dates. The BOE has instituted a program wherein Integrity data is regularly compared to data in the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) database. In instances where all data fields for a particular record match across both databases, except for the date of birth, we update the date of birth field in Integrity with the information from the DMV database. In addition, the BOE attempts to collect dates of birth from those voters with default birth dates who show up to vote.

ODCA Recommendation #2: The Board should maximize its use of ERIC to improve accuracy of the voter roll.

Response: BOE agrees.

The BOE intends to fully maximize its use of ERIC to improve accuracy of the voter roll. The Audit Report implies that the BOE is not maximizing its use of ERIC because it did not receive its first ERIC list maintenance reports until September 2015 despite joining ERIC in January 2014 and paying \$71,000 in dues between January 2014 and August 2015. BOE's "delay" in submitting its initial request for ERIC list maintenance reports was not due to mere inaction on the BOE's part. Rather, it was due to the fact that the BOE was engaged in extensive preparatory efforts with ERIC in advance of its first transmission of official data to ERIC, which occurred on July 28, 2014. ERIC members are not eligible to receive reports

mailing to 13,651 voters was in response to the Cross-state Movers Report that the Board received in September 2015. Based upon the information yielded from this mailing, the BOE deleted 5,943 voters who confirmed that they had moved out of state, updated or preserved the records of 190 voters who indicated that they still lived in the District of Columbia, and made the remaining 5943 voters, who did not respond to the mailing, inactive.

from ERIC until after they have transmitted their initial collection of data. Therefore, the BOE was not able to receive any list maintenance reports from ERIC until late July 2014.

Within 90 days of receiving list maintenance reports, ERIC members must initiate contact with 95% of the voters whose records are deemed to be inaccurate for the purpose of conducting list maintenance. This requirement operates in parallel with the requirement that all voter registration list maintenance activity based on information provided by ERIC must be conducted under the strict guidelines of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA). The NVRA mandates that any list maintenance program undertaken to systematically remove ineligible voters from the official list of registered voters must be completed by the 90th day before a primary or general election for federal office. *See* 52 U.S.C.A. § 20507(c)(2)(A).⁴ The BOE conducted a federal election on Tuesday, November 4, 2014. Accordingly, the Board would have had to complete any systematic list maintenance program, including an ERIC-based program, by Wednesday, August 6, 2014. Clearly, the BOE would not have had sufficient time to conduct and complete this activity prior to the November 2014 general election. In short, the BOE requested its inaugural list maintenance reports within approximately 10 months of the first real opportunity it had to do so.

The BOE has discussed herein (in the “Duplicate Voter Records” section and in footnote 3 regarding the Cross-state Movers Report) the actions it has taken with respect to the list maintenance reports it has received from ERIC, each of which has greatly increased the accuracy of the voter registry. The BOE looks forward to the improvements in its voter registry that will accrue from its participation in ERIC, and it considers the \$71,000 paid during the pertinent time period entirely reasonable. Moreover, as more states join, the BOE’s share of ERIC’s annual operating costs will decrease.


ODCA Recommendation #3: The Board should work with the Mayor and voter registration agencies (VRAs) to develop the capacity for electronic transmission of voter registration information from the DMV and other VRAs to the Board.

Response: BOE agrees.

The BOE agrees that voter registration information should be electronically transmitted from all VRAs to the BOE. In its April 2010 report titled “Study of the Feasibility of Implementing Automatic Voter Registration in the District of Columbia” that the BOE submitted to the Council pursuant to the Omnibus Election Reform Act of 2009 (the “AVR Report”), the BOE indicated its support for automatic voter registration, stating that it was “technologically feasible and could greatly improve the accuracy, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness of voter registration.” In the AVR Report, the BOE noted that the ability to electronically transmit voter registration data from VRAs to the BOE was integral to establishing automatic voter registration.

⁴ Although the NVRA 90-day provision applies only to federal elections, District law provides that any systematic list maintenance program shall be completed not less than the 90th day preceding any citywide election, including local elections.

Although the AVR Report discussed the electronic transmission of voter registration information from the DMV and other VRAs to the BOE in the specific context of establishing an automatic voter registration system, the BOE wholeheartedly supports the electronic transmission of voter registration data even in the absence of such a system, as it would greatly improve the accuracy of the information contained in the voter rolls. The BOE is ready and willing to partner with the Mayor and the Council to realize the goal of electronic transmission of voter registration information from the DMV, as well as the other VRAs, to the BOE.



JUNE 14, 2016
PRIMARY ELECTION
AFTER-ACTION REPORT

I. INTRODUCTION

D.C. Official Code §1-1001.05(K) and 3 DCMR § 817 mandate that, within 90 days following a general election, the District of Columbia Board of Elections (“BOE” or “Board”) must publish on its website an after-action report containing certain data and information concerning the election. Although it is not required to do so, BOE has consistently provided an after-action report after primary and special elections as well. Accordingly, BOE presents this after-action report (“the Report”) on the June 14, 2016 Primary Election (“the Election”).

In addition to the information requested in the afore-mentioned provisions, the Report also contains information on the performance of the Board’s newly-acquired voting machines, Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) related improvements implemented on Election Day, outreach efforts, student election workers, and “outstanding” issues that arose during the Election, as requested by the Council of the District of Columbia’s Committee on the Judiciary in its Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Report.

II. D.C. OFFICIAL CODE §1-1001.05(K)/ 3 DCMR § 817 DATA

A. Ballot Data

- 1. Total number of votes cast and counted, broken down by type of ballot, including the number of spoiled and special ballots that were not counted:**
 - a. Total Number of Ballots Cast:** 100,423
 - b. Total Number of Ballots Cast on Election Day:** 73,949
 - c. Total Number of Ballots Cast during Early Voting:** 19,153
 - d. Total Number of Absentee and Provisional Ballots Cast:** 7,321
 - e. Number of Spoiled Ballots Not Counted:** 664
 - f. Number of Special Ballots Not Counted:** 3,098 (2,767 on Election Day, and 331 during Early Voting)

B. Registration Activity Data

- 1. The Number of Persons Registered:**
 - a. More than 30 days preceding the election, broken down by party, ward, and precinct:** There were 437,304 registered voters as of May 13, 2016. (See Attachment #1)
 - b. Between 30 days preceding the election and Election Day:** There were 4,378 new registrations between May 13, 2016 and June 11, 2016, including 289 early voting same day registrations.
 - c. On Election Day:** There were 1,278 same day registrants on Election Day.

C. Election Worker Data

- 1. The number of polling place officials by precinct, broken down by position title:** (See Attachment #2)
- 2. Number of Student Election Workers on Election Day:** 52
- 3. A synopsis of any issues identified in Precinct Captain or Area Representative logs**

BOE reviews Precinct Captain's Notebooks (used to detail problems encountered on Election Day), tracks issues reported to the Help Desk by phone on Election Day, and holds post-election debriefing sessions to solicit feedback from the Precinct Captains. Area Representatives also record their observations for purposes of Board review and analysis. BOE also conducts online election workers surveys to solicit feedback regarding training, the quality of leadership provided by their Precinct Captains, and other topics. Some issues reported by Precinct Captains and Area Representatives are specific to the individual polling place or specific workers, but common issues and problems that occurred frequently included the following:

- Pre-Election Day (Monday) set-up teams were not able to access polling places at the planned times due to graduation ceremonies and other school-related functions;
- Precinct Captains requested:
 - more training on the special ballot process, how to troubleshoot technical issues, and how to set up the MiFi's for use with the Poll Pads;
 - more cross-training for workers; and
 - online and in-person refresher courses;
- Voter complaints about:
 - having to go to their old polling place to change their address and vote; and
 - party affiliation status being listed incorrectly in the Poll Pads;
- Lack of clarity regarding:
 - the roles and responsibilities for setting up and opening the polling place;
 - which Poll Pads were for check-in, and which ones were for special ballots; and
 - which individuals on the election worker team were certified as technicians; and
- Workers requested that their Precinct Captains contact them earlier about pre-Election Day set-up day and meeting times.

4. Performance Measurement Data of Polling Place Officials: (See Attachment #3)

D. Election Night Reporting Data

1. Copies of Any Unofficial Summary Reports Generated by BOE on Election Night (See Attachment #4)

E. Recommendations for Improving the Vote Tabulation Process

On February 20, 2016, the District of Columbia awarded a sole-source contract for the leasing of a new voting system and related equipment to Election Systems & Software, Inc. ("ES&S"). The system and equipment included 190 DS200 precinct-based optical scan tabulators equipped with wireless modem technology, 400 ExpressVote touchscreen ballot marking devices, one DS850 central tabulator (used to tabulate absentee, provisional, and curbside ballots), and ElectionWare Election Management System software. The cost for the base year of the leasing contract is

\$946,130, and the costs for the remaining two option years are \$802,630 and \$824,130, respectively.

As a result of acquiring the new voting equipment, the Board's vote tabulation process improved significantly, as was evidenced on election night. As the summary reports indicate, the early voting results were uploaded at 8:00 p.m. on election night, results from 128 of 143 precincts were received at 8:28 p.m., results from ten additional precincts were received at 9:21 p.m., and results from the five remaining precincts were received at 9:50 p.m., along with results for absentee ballots that had been received by BOE prior to Election Day. In sum, results from Election Day, early voting, and the majority of absentee ballots cast were all available within two hours after the polls had closed.

The improvement in the vote tabulation process is primarily attributable to two factors. First, the Board's new voting system employs a "blended" system of voting and tabulation, with the optical scan method as the basis of the system. This means that, regardless of whether a voter uses the DS200 or the ExpressVote, all ballots (except for absentee, special/provisional, and curbside ballots) are tabulated on the DS200. Therefore, BOE is now able to retrieve results from one unit of voting equipment rather than two, as we have had to do in past elections. Second, each DS200 is equipped with a modem that facilitates the wireless transmission of election results from each precinct to the Board's headquarters on election night after the closing of the polls. On the night of the Election, the results from 133 of 143 precincts were successfully transmitted to BOE via the DS200's wireless modem.¹

¹ The results from the remaining ten precincts were uploaded using USB Backup Memory Devices which are stored within each DS200 and contain results data. All USB Backup Memory Devices are returned to BOE headquarters on election night in accordance with established BOE practice.

F. NEW ELECTION EQUIPMENT

In past after-action reports, and in several appearances before the Council of the District of Columbia's Committee on the Judiciary, BOE discussed at length the fact that its voting equipment, acquired in a refurbished state in 2009, was aging and in dire need of replacement. To address this issue in advance of the Election, after wrapping up the April 28, 2015 Special Election to fill vacancies in two District of Columbia Council seats, BOE began the process to acquire voting equipment that would most effectively and efficiently meet the District of Columbia's election administration needs. BOE conducted a market survey of voting systems that had been certified by the Election Assistance Commission ("EAC") under the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines. On the basis of this survey, BOE invited three vendors to demonstrate their complete voting systems to the staff. Each of the selected vendors offered paper-based systems which included tabulators for Election Day, early voting, and central counting of absentee and special (provisional) ballots, as well as an ADA-accessible voting device which would allow voters with disabilities to vote independently.

BOE appraised each system to determine the ease of use for: (1) pollworkers in setting up, opening, and closing the voting equipment; (2) voters in using the voting equipment; and (3) election administrators in building the election, designing ballots, and tabulating votes on election night. BOE also reviewed each system for compatibility with both its existing data management system and its current election administration processes and procedures, so as to facilitate as seamless and fluid a change to the voting program as possible. BOE determined that ES&S was the only vendor of the three that was capable of implementing a compatible upgrade to the Board's existing data management system. Moreover, because BOE already had a ballot purchase contract in place with ES&S, which was the vendor for the Board's previous equipment, contracting with another vendor would result in the waste of the money and resources that had already been expended. As a result, BOE was able to lease new voting equipment from ES&S, including 190 DS200 precinct-based tabulators, 400 ExpressVote touchscreen ballot marking devices, one DS850 central tabulator, and the ElectionWare Election Management System software, pursuant to a sole source contract.

In addition to voting equipment, BOE also procured new electronic poll books ("e-pollbooks"), devices used to check voters in at the polls, through a competitive bidding process. BOE staff and staff from the Office of Contracting and Procurement ("OCP") evaluated proposals submitted by three vendors and, at the conclusion of the solicitation process, KNOWiNK was selected to fulfill BOE's request for 600 e-pollbooks.

Considering the often lengthy procurement process, it was not a foregone conclusion that BOE would have new election equipment in time for the Election. In fact, BOE did not take delivery of the new voting equipment until March, and the Poll Pads until April. BOE could not have succeeded in meeting its procurement goals without the determination and persistence of its senior staff, and the extraordinary effort and leadership from OCP. Sheila Mobley, Jeffrey Tisdale, Alisha Wright, and other members of the OCP staff deserve commendation for their effort to meet the Board's timetable for procurement of voting equipment and e-pollbooks.

The election equipment performed extremely well during the Election. The most commonly reported issue was paper jams; there were seven reported with DS200s, and 16 reported with ExpressVotes. All issues reported through the Election Day Call Center were able to be resolved by either precinct-based Election Workers or technical rovers with the exception of three. In these three instances, the machines at issue were replaced with reserve equipment: one DS200 was replaced (Precinct #1 (Walker-Jones Education Campus); election definition could not be found), and two ExpressVotes were replaced (Precinct #25 (Goodwill Baptist Church) and Precinct #85 (Specialty Hospital of Washington); persistent screen calibration issues)). After the election, maintenance service was performed on each voting equipment unit for which issues were reported so that they could be completed prior to the start of logic and accuracy testing for the November General Election.

The Poll Pads, used to check voters in at voting locations, also exceeded performance expectations. The Poll Pads were equipped with technology that allowed election workers to scan the bar codes on voters' Department of Motor Vehicles-issued identification cards, voter registration cards, and a BOE-designed voter-specific informational mailer to check voters in. Prior to the Election, BOE had anticipated that the average check-in time for voters would be approximately 1½ minutes; the actual average time for a voter to check in was 58 seconds. Although BOE provided back-up paper poll books at each precinct to be used in the event that the Poll Pads failed or lost power, none of the back-up paper poll books needed to be used.

G. ACCESSIBILITY

BOE takes reasonable steps to facilitate voter access for individuals with disabilities. In 2015, BOE hired an ADA Coordinator to manage BOE efforts to ensure the accessibility of all programs. The first priority was to conduct a survey of all polling place facilities to assess accessibility. On the basis of that survey, BOE relocated two precincts due to accessibility concerns: Precinct #13 was relocated from Our Lady Queen of the America's Church to St. Margaret's Episcopal Church, and Precinct #88 was relocated from Thankful Baptist Church to Eastern Market where it was combined with Precinct #89.

Modifications were also made to several other precincts. For example, temporary ramps were placed at Precinct #92 (Zion Baptist Church) and Precinct #45 (Metropolitan Police Department - Regional Operation Command (North)). Additionally, ADA-approved handrails were installed on the ramp at Precinct #2 (School Without Walls). Additional surveys with representatives from the Office on Disability Rights ("ODR") and the Department of General Services ("DGS") were also conducted to identify and make structural improvements to public facilities used as polling places. BOE is working with DGS to implement modifications at the relatively few structurally inaccessible polling places prior to the November General Election. BOE also informed the District Department of Transportation's ("DDOT") Public Space Regulation Administration section, as well as their ADA Coordinator, that several local facilities that serve as polling places need to be modified in order to make them ADA-compliant for the November General Election. DDOT is responsible for the planning, designing, construction, and maintenance of the District's streets, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, traffic signals, and street lights. Unfortunately, DDOT informed BOE that they have already allocated their 2017 fiscal year funds for other previously scheduled projects, and will be unable to make any modifications in advance of the November General Election.

BOE is also relocating several precincts for the General Election. The following precincts will be relocated for accessibility reasons: Precinct #85 will be relocated from BridgePoint Hospital Capitol Hill to Northeast Library, Precinct #106 will be relocated from Davis Elementary School to Ridge Road Recreation Center, and Precinct #42 will be relocated from Mt. Rona Baptist Church to Raymond Recreation Center. BOE continues to offer curbside voting as an alternative method of voting at all polling places on Election Day.

When BOE considers locations for polling places, we are seeking accessible facilities located within precinct boundaries that will be available for the Board's use on Election Day and the day before for set-up purposes. These facilities must be able to accommodate our entire voting program – our personnel, our equipment, poll watchers and election observers, representatives of the media, *etc.* – and, most importantly, the number of voters that reside in that precinct. The accommodation must be in a manner that will allow voters to vote expediently and in secrecy. While BOE has identified facilities within precinct boundaries that can accommodate BOE's voting program and are structurally accessible, and thus better options for voters with disabilities than the ones that BOE selects as polling places, identifying these alternative locations is only the first step; the owners of these facilities must also agree to allow BOE to use them, and attaining such consent has proven challenging.

To address operational accessibility issues at polling places, BOE enlisted 30 volunteers to serve as ADA Compliance Assistants on Election Day. The ADA Compliance Assistants were each assigned four to five polling places to visit throughout Election Day to identify and address any correctable issues that presented barriers to voting for persons with disabilities. ADA Compliance Assistants were tasked with several duties, including: completing a precinct operational accessibility survey; posting directional signage along routes to the polling place's accessible entrance and the voting area itself; propping doors open where possible; assisting election workers with assigning accessible parking spaces where possible; placing the accessible entrance bells at the appropriate places; and ensuring that auxiliary aides, including magnifying glasses, language kits, and headphones, were available and prominently displayed so that voters were aware of their availability. BOE will be assessing the program's function for the November General Election.

As always, BOE strives to work with Disability Rights DC at University Legal Services ("DRDC") to achieve a consensus with respect to identifying and correcting accessibility issues with polling places. BOE reviewed DRDC's recently released DC Voting Access Report regarding the Election, and while we agree with DRDC that some of the precincts identified in the Access Report do present accessibility issues that need to be addressed, we object to several of its findings. To highlight a few of the findings that BOE disputes:

- DRDC reports that St. Margaret's Episcopal Church is inaccessible due to a steep ramp. However, the ramp at this location has a slope below the 1:12 (8.33%) maximum required by the ADA. The disputed threshold at the entrance is also within the legal limit;
- DRDC reports that ramps at Precincts #1 (Walker-Jones Education Campus) and #113 (E. River Washington Senior Wellness Center) are inaccessible. However, neither of these facilities has ramps;
- DRDC reports that Precinct #63 (Takoma Education Campus) was operationally inaccessible because doors were not automatic and only semi-propped. However, this facility has an automatic door with a "Push-To-Open" button. Further, less than four pounds of force is required to manually open the door. DRDC also reported that the ramp at this location was also inaccessible. However, the slope was below the 1:12 (8.33%) maximum required by the ADA; and
- Thresholds listed as being too high at several polling places were actually within the legal limit mandated by the ADA.

BOE is constantly exploring solutions that will increase the accessibility of its voting program, and we will work to survey precincts jointly with DRDC, ODR, and DGS so that these parties, all of which have a vested interest in ensuring accessibility for all District of Columbia residents, can come to an agreement and solutions regarding what issues should be addressed at each polling place. It is important to note that BOE did not receive any complaints from voters regarding their inability to enter precincts, or the unavailability of Election Workers to open doors or provide any other type of assistance during the Election.

As noted earlier, BOE leased new voting equipment in advance of the 2016 election cycle. The equipment includes 400 ExpressVote machines, touchscreen ballot marking devices which produce voter verifiable paper records and allow voters with disabilities to vote privately and independently. Although the ExpressVotes provide an accessible solution for voters with disabilities, their use was not restricted solely to such voters. These machines were available for use by all voters. Each precinct on Election Day was equipped with two ExpressVotes, one of which was designated as the "Accessible Ballot Marking Device." The Accessible Ballot Marking Device was situated such that it could accommodate voters who use a wheelchair or prefer to sit while voting, and it had assistive devices attached to it.

H. OUTREACH

BOE's administration of the Election was most impacted by the enactment of the Primary Date Alteration Act of 2013 ("the PDAA"), and the acquisition of new election equipment. Among other things, the PDAA:

- Established that the primary elections for federal and local offices would be held on the second Tuesday in June in 2016, and that, afterwards, primary elections for local offices and the Delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives would be held on first Tuesday in September, and presidential preference primaries would be held on the 2nd Tuesday in June in presidential election years;
- Required that all absentee ballots must be received by no later than 8:00 p.m. on Election Day;
- Established that same-day registrants who provide acceptable proof of residence (current and valid government photo identification or a copy of a current utility bill, bank statement, government check, pay check, or other document specified by BOE that shows the current name and address of the voter) may vote regular ballots;
- Precluded most voters from voting outside of the precincts serving their current residence addresses;
- Permitted voters who file election day changes of address ("EDCOAs") to vote regular ballots provided they vote at the precinct that serves the address listed on the Board's records, *i.e.*, their old address, and provide proof of new residence (current and valid government photo identification or a copy of a current utility bill, bank statement, government check, pay check, or other document specified by BOE that shows the current name and address of the voter); and
- Required write-in candidates to file Declarations of Candidacy no later than 4:45 p.m. the day after a primary election, and no later than 4:45 p.m. on the 3rd day after a general or special election.

As a result of the PDAA and the acquisition of new election equipment, BOE was required to substantially revise its election administration calendar, procedures, and forms, develop a new poll worker training curriculum and manual, and issue supporting regulations. In addition, it was necessary for BOE to implement a robust public outreach effort to ensure that candidates and voters were aware of the reforms, and how they would be impacted as a result, and familiar with the new technology in advance of the Election. To assist with this endeavor, BOE engaged the services of CD Global Strategies Group, a strategic communications and public affairs firm.

BOE took a proactive and interactive approach regarding online media interaction, as well as continuing traditional media methods of information dissemination. Highlights of the Board's

voter education campaign include:

- The publication of a Voter's Guide, which was organized in an easy-to-follow Question and Answer format, and included sample ballots, information on the new election technology and changes to the voting program, voter registration and absentee ballot applications, polling place relocations, and more;
- The dissemination of a voter-specific informational mailer that included the voter's precinct, party, Advisory Neighborhood Commission Single Member District, polling place, and a copy of the voter's official ballot. The mailer also contained a voter-specific bar code that election workers could scan to check the voter in at the polling location; and
- Twitter, Facebook, and the Board's website were updated frequently to provide BOE followers with comprehensive information about the Board's activities and important dates and deadlines.

To ensure that the Board's messaging regarding the Election was spread throughout the entire city, BOE implemented the Ward Outreach Coordinator Program. BOE hired 32 Ward Outreach Coordinators, each of whom was assigned to conduct voter registration and education and outreach activities in a particular ward.

Between April 9, 2016 and Election Day, Ward Outreach Coordinators conducted or participated in a total of 124 outreach activities for the Election. They registered voters, distributed informational brochures, and/or demonstrated the new voting equipment at Advisory Neighborhood Commission meetings, civic association meetings, naturalization ceremonies, and community fairs. They administered absentee balloting at nursing homes/senior living facilities, and at the District's correctional facilities. They provided voter registration applications and information to students at 10 private schools and District of Columbia Public Charter High Schools ("DCPCHS").

As a result of the Ward Outreach Coordinators' efforts:

- 548 students in the District of Columbia were registered to vote;
- 84 students submitted applications to serve as Student Election Workers, and 52 students served in that capacity on Election Day;
- 476 new citizens registered to vote at naturalization ceremonies;
- 529 residents at nursing homes/senior living facilities voted absentee at their respective facilities; and
- 94 individuals incarcerated for misdemeanors voted absentee at their respective facilities.

I. STUDENT ELECTION WORKERS

Members of the Board's Voter Education and Outreach Team worked directly with the Social Studies Director for District of Columbia Public Schools ("DCPS") to recruit students to work at precincts on Election Day. Student Election Worker Applications were distributed at every DCPS school, DCPCHS school, and private school.

Approximately 100 students submitted Student Election Worker Applications and appeared for training, which was conducted at the Board's offices and on-site at National Collegiate Prep and McKinley for students at National Collegiate Preparatory Public Charter School, Ballou High School, McKinley Technical Education Campus, and Luke C. Moore Academy. Students had the option of working a full day on Election Day and receiving either \$180, 15 service hours, or \$90 and 7.5 service hours, or working a half day and receiving either \$50 or 4 service hours.

While 75 students committed to work on Election Day, only 52 actually worked; all 52 students worked the full day. Twenty-three students were "no shows," meaning that the "no show" rate for workers under the age of 19 was 30.7%.

J. OUTSTANDING ISSUES

1. Election Day Change of Address

The provision in the PDAA that required a voter to file an EDCOA at the precinct serving their old residence address, *i.e.*, the address listed on the Board's records, rather than the precinct serving their current address, in order to have their ballot counted, proved problematic and confusing for both voters and Election Workers during the Election. Previously, voters filing changes of address had been able to vote special ballots at the precincts in which they actually resided. These special ballots were counted upon verification of the voters' eligibility, allowing the voters to vote for officials who would actually represent them.


To remedy this issue, BOE has collaborated with the Council's Committee on the Judiciary to craft legislation that will allow voters to file changes of address at the precincts serving their current residence addresses and vote regular ballots at that time upon presenting acceptable proof of residence at the new address. This legislation will be in place prior to the November General Election.

2. Mobile App Party Affiliation Status Issue

During the Election, BOE received complaints from voters who indicated that their party affiliation status was incorrectly indicated in the Board's records. This was, understandably, a concern because of the District's closed primary system, which dictates that only voters registered with the District's three major parties can participate.

For security reasons, neither the mobile app nor web interface stores any voter data. Thus, if a voter updates his or her information through those mechanisms, only the updated fields are transmitted. For example, if a voter updates her address through the mobile app, all other fields, including party affiliation status, remain blank and are not transmitted. With respect to applications where fields other than party affiliation status were updated, the party affiliation status was viewed, in the Board's voter registry back-end processing logic, as an application in which "No Party" was indicated, and processed accordingly.

Upon discovering the flaw in the processing logic, BOE took immediate steps to rectify it. Each voter who alleged that their party affiliation status was listed incorrectly had the opportunity to vote a special ballot. BOE reviewed each "incorrect party" special ballot to determine whether the voter's party affiliation status had been changed to "No Party" after an interaction with the mobile app and, in cases where it appeared that the voter's party affiliation status had been changed inadvertently, the voter's ballot was counted.

Recommendation	Agency Action (choose one)	Details	Describe Any Documentary Evidence Provided
<p>1. The BOE should develop written policies and procedures to ensure the implementation and monitoring of the following practices to ensure the integrity of the voter roll, as required by both federal and District law:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Removal of incarcerated felons from the voter list; • Removal of decedents from the voter list; • Removal of duplicate voter records from the voter list; and • Removal of inaccurate birth dates from the voter list. 	<p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Implemented</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> In progress (expected completion date _____)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Recommendation no longer applicable</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> No action intended; management accepts risk</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Not started</p>	<p>The Board has written policies and procedures in place to ensure the implementation and monitoring of the removal of incarcerated felons, decedents, duplicate voters, and voters with inaccurate birth dates. These voter list maintenance policies, which are routinely reviewed to ensure compliance with federal and District law, incorporate the Board's participation in ERIC and STEVE.</p>	
<p>2. The Board should maximize its use of ERIC to improve accuracy of the voter role.</p>	<p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Implemented</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> In progress (expected completion date _____)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Recommendation no longer applicable</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> No action intended; management accepts risk</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Not started</p>	<p>The Board has established and implemented a regular schedule for uploading data to ERIC and obtaining ERIC list maintenance reports that will both facilitate greater accuracy in the Board's voter registry and introduce efficiencies into the Board's overall list maintenance program.</p> <p>The Board receives and takes action on ERIC Deceased and In-state Duplicate reports on a bi-monthly basis, and will receive and take action on the other list maintenance reports in a manner consistent with the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA).</p> <p>Most recently, the Board took appropriate action on the following ERIC </p>	<p>(cont. from column on left) reports, which the Board received from ERIC on July 20, 2016:</p> <p>Cross-State Updates (BOE mailed 827 letters to the individuals identified on July 22, 2016; BOE removed 140 individuals and updated 59 records)</p> <p>In-State Updates (BOE mailed 18,223 letters to the individuals identified on August 1, 2016; BOE removed 59 individuals and updated 3020 records)</p>

<p>3. The Board should work with the Mayor and VRAs to develop the capacity for electronic transmission of voter registration information from the DMV and other VRAs to the Board.</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Implemented</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In progress (expected completion date <u>10/01/17</u>)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Recommendation no longer applicable</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> No action intended; management accepts risk</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Not started</p>	<p>The Board is ready and willing to partner with the Mayor and VRAs to realize the goal of electronic transmission of voter registration information from all VRAs.</p> <p>Pursuant to the Automatic Voter Registration Act of 2016 ("the Act"), the DMV will transmit electronic registration information to the Board that will be used to register voters and maintain an up-to-date voter registry. An earlier draft of the Act included all VRAs, but the final version omitted all VRAs except for the DMV due to fiscal concerns.</p> <p>The 10/1/2017 completion date refers to the date by which the Board expects to be in full compliance with the Act.</p>	
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**NOVEMBER 8, 2016
GENERAL ELECTION
AFTER-ACTION REPORT**

I. INTRODUCTION

Under D.C. Official Code §1-1001.05(K) and 3 DCMR § 817, within 90 days following a general election, the District of Columbia Board of Elections (the Board) must publish on its website an after-action report containing certain data and information concerning the election. The report must contain the following information:

- The total number of ballots cast and counted, with subtotals for each type of ballot;
- The total number of spoiled and special ballots not counted;
- The total number of persons registered to vote more than thirty (30) days preceding the election, broken down by party, ward, and precinct;
- The number of persons who registered to vote between thirty (30) days preceding the election and the date of the election;
- The number of persons who registered to vote at an early voting center;
- The number of persons who registered to vote on Election Day;
- The number of polling place officials at each precinct, broken down by position title;
- Copies of any unofficial summary reports generated by the Board on election night;
- A summary of issues identified in Precinct Captain or Area Representative reports;
- Performance measurement data of polling place officials;
- A description of any irregularities experienced on Election Day;
- Recommendation for means by which the efficiency, accuracy, and speed of counting and reporting election results can be improved, including equipment or technology and an estimate of associated costs; and
- Any other relevant information.

Accordingly, the Board presents this after-action report on the November 8, 2016 General Election.